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This research exaI:lined the relationship between carn-
paign spending and electoral success in 1977 Kentucky House 
races and 1978 U. S . House and Se ",ate races . The results 
i ndicated that the winning c andidate's percentage of cam-
paign expenditureF has a significant effect on the candi-
date' s vote percentage . This effect is greater in u.s. House 
races than in U. S. Se nate races. In Kentucky House races , 
the effect of spending on electoral success was only signi-
ficant in open seat races. Regression results confirmed the 
importance of challenger spending in congressional races and 
indicated that the effect of challenge r expenditures on votes 
is much greater than the effect of incumbent expenditures. 
Efforts to use challenger expend~ L ures to predict incumbent 
expenditures were only partially suc~essful. Finally, 
regression analysis designed to link constituency charac-
teristics to the effectiveness of campaign spending was 
unsuccessful. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
As the American political apparatus gears up for its 
first national election of th e new decade, it seems appro-
priate to tak e another look at che role of money in the 
e l e ctoral proc ess. It was in th e de cade of the seventies 
that apprehension over the importance of campaign spending 
to electoral s uccess became widespread enough to trigger a 
formal institutiona l r esponse . The passage of the 1974 
Campaign Spending Law and subsequent debate r egarding public 
f inancing of congressional e l ect ions ultimate l y represent 
e fforts to prevent the further erosion of a democratic 
selection process and , perhaps more importantly, to pre-
vent the erosion o f public trus ~ ~nd confidence in that 
process and the leadersh ip it produces . 
This study is an e ffort to contribute to a g rowing 
bod.- of lite rature dealing with campaign spending in Ameri-
can politics. It is h oped that this study will help clarify 
money ' s role in the political pr~cess . 
Ie Literature Review 
The Costs of Democracy, by Alexander Heard, r.epresents 
one of the first comprehensive discussions of money in 
American politics. Heard's work includes an analysis of the 
1 
2 
sources of campaign funds, how they are raised and the 
importance of money in elections. His commentary is direc-
ted at questioning the long believed political myth that 
expenditures a r e a reliable index of the outcome of elec-
tions, a generalization that remains convincing only as long 
as Republicans outspend and outpoll Democrats . Rejecting 
the notion of voters as cattle , being prodded by crafty, 
free-spending public relations men, Heard was skept i cal of 
the importance of money to electoral success. He concluded 
that lithe effe ct of money in politics is probably more cer -
tain in determining who the candidates will be than in 
determining the outcome of elections."l Notwithstanding his 
skepticism, Heard began asking the questions which were to 
serve as points of departure for researche rs probing the 
link between campaign spending and electoral outcomes . 
In the twenty years since Heard's work, an increased 
r e liance upon costly mass media as a means of communicating 
with voters and a weakening , . f party loyalties has become 
evident. These developments wo u ld seem to argue that expen-
ditures playa more important role in determining the out-
come of legislative elections than Heard e arlie r suggested. 
A supposition that such a link exists is especially convinc-
ing in the case o f challenger-incumbent races , where the 
incumbe~ t's campaign advantages magnify the importance of 
challenger campaign spending . An incumbent legislator has 
lAlexander Heard, 'fhe Costs of Democracy (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1960), p. 35 . 
3 
great e r access to virtually every type resource necessary 
for electora l s uccess . Incumbents enjoy more opportunities 
to make themselves visible and, of course, can build a posi-
tive record of service , an opportunity not available t o the 
challenger. Incumbents also have various governmental 
resources at their disposal. David Lputhold writes: 
The federal government subsidizes t he campaigns of 
incumbents but not of challengers. The government con-
~ributes congressional salaries during the campaign, 
salar ies of fie ld representatives who are serving as 
campaign managers , franking privileges which a llow 
congressmen to poll the constituency or send thin l y 
veiled campaign lite rature r t limited cost, extensiv e 
research facilities , such as the Library of Congress, 
free office space (which may obviate the need for r ent-
ing a campa i gn headquarters) a nd a secretarial staff. 2 
A number of studies have discovered a positive r e l a -
tionship bet\V'een campaign spending and e lectora l s uccesS in 
legislative con t ests . A 1976 study found that while incum-
bent expenditures had l ittle effect on the incumbent's vic-
tory margin , challenger expenditures did have a significant 
impact .) The researchers exam ined 1972 and 1(,, \ elections 
for the California State i'\ssembly and Congressional Delega-
tion , and the 1972 U.S. Hous e elections. Incumbent expendi -
t ures, challenger I.. "'pendi tures , and the cha llenger 's par ty 
registration were included in a multiple r egression equa tion 
uesigned to predict the incumbent 's v i c t ory ma ~g in in 
in 
& Sons, 
3Stanton A. Glantz, Alan I. Abramowitz, and 
Michael P. Burkart, "Election Outcomes: Whose Money 
Matters," Th e Journal o f Politics 38 (Novembe r 1976):1033- 38. 
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California races. The r esults indi cated that while incum-
bent ' s expenditures had little impact on incumbe nt's victory 
margin, both challenger's expenditures a nd party strength 
did. Simi l a r results we re obtained in analyzing 1972 House 
races ( although no meas ure of party strength was included in 
this ana l y s i s ). The authors expla in this finding by noting 
that while incumbents enjoy numerou s opportunities t o make 
points with voters, the actua l campaign repr e sents the chal-
l enger ' s on l y opportunity to make a n impression on the 
e lectorate. 
This finding was substantiated by the r esearch o f Gary 
4 Jacobson , whose efforts constitute some of the more exha u s -
tive empirical research in this field . Jacobson examined 
1972 and 1974 U. S. House and Senate e l ections with a focus 
on cha lle nger-incumbent r a c es. using a regress ion equation, 
Jacobs on i ncluded t he c hallenger 's percentage of the two-
party vote as the dependent variable . Chall enge r campaign 
e xpendi tures in U. S. House e l ec tions , _.nc1 incumbent campaign 
expe nditures (each in thousands of dol lars ) were entered as 
independent variables, as was t he challenger's party 
str e ng th. 'l'he party strength variable was measured by the 
pe r c e ntage o f th e vote won by the c hal l e nger ' s par ty in the 
las t elect i on for that seat. The results not only indicate 
that ch allenger s pe nd ing has the greatest impact on the out-
come of elections, but a l s o t hat a we ak ne ga t ive e ff e c t of 
4Gary C. Jacobson, "The Effects of Campaign Spending 
in c ongress ional Elections, II American Political Science 
Review 72 (June 1976) :469-91. 
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incumbent spending on the challenger's vote is found when 
challenge r spending is controlled . Jacobson infers that 
incwnbents are able to expand their f i.nancial resources in 
r esponse to a serious challenge , as r e presen ted by the chal-
lenger' s spending . This "reactive spending ," he notes, 
either does them little good or at best does not match the 
benefits challengers derive from an equivalent increase . S 
In a similar investigation of 1974 Selate elections, subs-
tituting expenditure per vote for dollar amounts, Jacobson's 
findings parallel his ~i ndings based upon the U.S. House. 
Certainly one important variable in evaluating the 
role nf campaign spending is broadcast expenditures. As 
mentioned earlier, voter awareness is crucial for a challen-
ger who confronts an incumbent with much wider name recogni-
tion. 'l'he mass media has become a primary method of 
increasing voter awareness of a candidate. 
A study by Dawson a nd Zinser6 d i Tect ly confronts this 
aspect of campaign spending and its explanator~' power. The 
researchers performed r egression ana lys is with t he winner ' s 
share of ~he vote as the dependent variable and the winner's 
share of broadcast e xpenditures as th e independent variable 
for 1970 u.S. House and Senate e lections . Their results 
s how that while the winner's share of broadcast expenditures 
SIbi d. , p. 472. 
6pau1 A. Dawson and James A. Zinser, "Broadcast Expen-
ditures and Electoral Outcomes in 1970 Congressional 
Elections," American Politics Quarterly (October 1970), 
pp. 398-402. 
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has a significantly positive effect on his margin of vic-
tory, the effect is up to five times greater in Senate races 
than it is in Hous e races . An interpretation of the find-
ings , offe r ed by the a uthors, is that a n • .i.nimum expenditure 
per capita is necessary to break established voting patterns 
and turnout and that this minimum level may be achieved only 
in senat o rial campaigns . In attempting to discove~ the 
de terminants of lne wi nne r's level of broadcast expenditures 
the researchels found that although voter turnout, ethni-
C ~ ty, urbanism , incumbency, and party had littl e effect on 
winner's broadcast expenditure s , los e r's broadcast expendi-
tures were a significant determining factor . This coincides 
with the II r e ac tive spending" phenomenon later detailed by 
Jacobson a nd b y Glantz et al. 
Finally , a 1976 study by Welch 7 examined the effect of 
incumbency, expenditures, and party s trength on vote per-
centages in cong r · :s ional and state legislative races. 
t>lelch reported th:ree s ignificant , i f tentative, findings. 
In construing the relationship betwee n variables as a p r o -
duction function, he found evidence to indicate that the 
marginal product of campaign expenditures decreases beyond a 
certain point. That is, the Law of Diminishing Returns 
seems to apply t o the r e lationship of spending to votes. 
We lch's analysis also points towards greater efficiency of 
spending in primary elections than in general electi ons. 
7William P. Welch, "The Effectiveness of Expenditures 
in State Legis l ative Races," American Politics Quarter l y 4 
(July 1976) :333-56. 
Finally, his efforts to show that the efficiency of per 
capita expenditures increases as the size of the constit-
uency increases were unsuccessful. 
II. Statement of Objectives 
This research has three primary objectives: (1) To 
identify the relationship between campaign spending and 
electoral success , (2) to more c learly define the role of 
campaign expenditures in challenger-incumbent races, and 
7 
(3) to explore the effect of socio-economic variables on the 
relationship bebveen campaign spending and electoral success 
in u.s . congressional elections . 
Chapter Two will dea l with the first objective. The 
analysis will close ly parallel that of earlier research; 
data will be drawn from 1978 U.S. House a nd Senate contes ts. 
In addition, 1977 Kentucky House races will be included in 
the research. When prior research has included stat e legis-
lative elections, relatively pop u O llS and competitive 
states , such as California, have been se l ected. The state 
of Kentucky constitutes a quite different subject in that it 
is p~ ~dominantly rural and less politically competitive than 
man~' states. 
The second objective will Le addressed in Chapter 
Three. The task here will be to measure the impact of chal-
l enger spending on electoral performance. The analysis will 
seek to confirm or modify two conclusions reached in earlier 
research: (1) Are challenger expenditures more effective in 
producing votes than incumbent expenditures? (2) Does the 
theory of reactive spending, as formulated by the Jacobson 
and Glantz studies , hold true for the l egislative races 
under study? 
8 
The third objective will be addressed in Chapter Four. 
Earlier r esearch has eit~er ignored or dealt with socio-
economic variables in a rather cursory manner. This re-
search will use soc i a - economic V ,- riables , indicative of the 
heterogeneity or homogeneity 0 f u . s. House districts and 
states, in order ~J assess the impact of constituency 
cha racteristics on the relationship between campa i gn spend-
ing and elec t ora l outcomes. Chapter Five will summarize the 
results of the r egress ion equations developed to meet each 
objective and offer the author ' s conclusions. 
CHAPTER II 
CAMPAIGN SPENDING AND ELECTORAL SUCCESS 
The amount of money candidat es spend in congressional 
elec tions has risen dramatically in rece nt yea rs. In 1972, 
35 . 5 million dollars were spent by U. S . senatoria l ca.ldi-
daLes . 8 In 19 78, 35 .2 million dolla r s were spent in just 
n i ne of thirty-three Senate races. Although the rise in 
spendin g by candidates fo r the U.S. House of Representatives 
is not qu ite as steep as in the Senate, t he 1978 mean expen-
diture for House incumbents had r eached over $100,000 . 
Po liticia ns clearly believe in the importance of money 
in winning elections. Th is chapter will explore the extent 
to wh ich candidate perceptions are accurate. 
I. Methodology 
A. Case Inclus ion Criteria 
Only cont ested l egislative seats were included in the 
analysis. contests involving two major party candidates 
were selected . Races involving one major party candidate 
and a third party candidate were omitted. 
SHerbert E . Ale xande r, Financing Politics (Washington, 
D.C., congressional Quarterly Press . 1976), p. 212. 
9 
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In 1977 Ke ntucky Hous e races, 46 cases were selected: 
34 challe nger-incumbe nt races and 12 open seat races.
9 
In 
1978 House of Repr e sentatives races , a total of 360 contests 
were include d in the a nalysis : 309 challenger-incumbent 
races and 5 1 ope n seat races. 10 In the U.S . Senate , a total 
of 33 cases we r e se l ec t ed , 2 1 of which were challe nger-
11 
incumbent contests and 12 of which were open seat races. 
The de cision to select o n l y those c ases involving two 
major party candidates and to cmit third party candidates 
from the computation of th e variables was made for several 
reasons . As We lch has noted, major party candidates are 
prima rily concerned with obtaining a majority of the two-
12 party vote. Receiving a majority of the total vote is 
irre l e v a nt unless a third c a ndidate threatens to run ahead 
of a major party candidate. 13 In addition, to include the 
9 Of the 100 House contests ;.n 1977, 53 candidates 
were unopposed in the g e neral e l~r . l on and 1 case was 
deleted because only 1 ma j or part~ candidate ra n . In the 
Kentucky Senate, there we~e too f e w co nt ested races to war-
ran t inclusion in t he study. 
lOIn 1978, fifty-two U.S. House sea ts we re uncon-
t estea. A total of twe lve races did not include two major 
party candidates. Six races were dropped due to the un-
availability of campaign expenditure information and four 
races were eliminated because data necessar y to compute the 
party strength measure ·..,ras not aVa ilable. 
llIn lQ78, only one candidate for the U. S. Senate ran 
unoppo 3edi c ampaign spending information was unavailable for 
o ne case. 
12Welch, p. 337. 
13 In only two instances did a third candida te pose 
such a threat. Charles Evers came within 9 percent of the 
vote of the Democratic candidate in a Mississippj. Senate 
race, and, in New Jersey's 14th House district the third 
11 
third party vote in the dependent variable would require the 
incorporation of third party expenditures and party strength 
as well. The inclusion of this information would subs tan-
tially lessen the precision of the independent va - iables . 
B . Me asurement of the Variables 
The regression equation d eve loped to investigate the 
first objective employs the following variables for the 
u .s. House and Senate analysis: 
Winner ' s vote, the dependent variable is de fined as the 
winner's vote divided by the total two-
party vote. 
Winnarts 
party strength, 
~'linner I 5 
expendl.tures, 
an independent variable , is defined as 
the winning party's tota l vote in three 
previous elections for the seat divide d 
by the total two-party. vote in these 
three election years . 14 
an independent variable, is defined as 
the total of the winner's primary and 
general election expenditures, divided 
by the total of the winner ' s and the 
loser' ~ e xpenditure in both primary and 
genero j ele ctions. 
A percentage measure o f party strength was chosen. 
Party strength expressed as a percentage has the advantage 
vf simplicity in computation and presentation. Such a 
measure also allows ordering on an interval scale , subject 
to common statist i cs and tests. In order to ensure the 
candidate came within 6 percent of the losing Republican's 
vote. 
14\Hth the exce ption of one Senate seat and five House 
districts, for which information was available for only two 
election years. 
12 
comparability and uniformity of the data, both the spending 
and vote variables a re expressed as percentages. 
In measuring winner ' s expenditures, primary a nd gen-
era l election spending have been summed. This was done in 
the belie f that benefits derived from primary spending carry 
over to the general e lection . By includ ing primarj spending 
the measure can deal effectively with a candidate whos e 
general e lection expe nditures may be quite low, but who 
spends signif i cantly more than his or he r opponent in gain-
ina the party nomination. Spending in each stag e of the 
campairyn has as its goa l increasing the voter awareness of 
the candidate . 
With regard to Kentucky House r a c es , the winner's vote 
and expenditures are measured in the same way as th e U.S. 
Congress . However, due to t he November 1972 redistricting 
in Kentucky, only two e lection years were available for use 
in constructing th e party strength measure . In addition, 
data on votes cas t ~n ten unopposed 1973 races was unavail-
able. To handle thi s d i fficul ty th e ave r a g e vote in unop-
po sed race s was calculate d from a total of ninety-nine 
unopposed races in 1975 and 1977 and included for these ten 
cases . 
Pre vious research in this subject area has often used 
party registration as a means of measuring party strength. 
In relatively compe titive states this method may be a ppro-
priate; but in Ke ntucky, a state dominated by the Democratic 
party , such a meas ure would sev erely underestimate 
13 
Republican party stre ngth by fai l ing t o take into account 
voters wh o r egister as Democrats mere l y so that t hey can 
cast a vote in the primary . Whil e s ome studies, such as 
Jacobson's, have used a candidatels party performance in the 
e l ect i Gn year immedia t e l y preceding the year under s tudy, 
the measure used here seems more reliable . By incorporat-
ing three e l ection years (two for Kent ucky r aces) it is 
capabl E' both of contr ol ling for an atypical elec ·: ion year 
and of establ i shing a fair l y firm t r end of pa~ty suppor t. 
C . Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive stat i stics for the variab l es in Ken tucky 
Hous e r aces are presented in Table 1. Ther e a re no sur -
prises here. Th e high mean party stre ngth per cen tages 
r e flect the domi nance of a sing l e party -- usually Demo-
c r atie -- in most l egis l ative districts. A mean winner ' s 
vote of 70 percent in Kent ucky l e gislativ e races indicates 
that many House seats are actua lly decided in thp ,Yrima ry. 15 
Descript i ve statistic s for u .s . Ho us e and Se nate races 
are presented :'n Table 2. Th e mean vote and party strength 
per centages in House .L. "" ces ind i cate a somewhat more compe ti-
tive arena . The Sena t e figures r ef l ect even greater 
l5A conclusion rei n forced by the fact that 53 percen t 
of the seats i n the Kentucky House we r e unconteste d in th e 
general election , as compar ed with 11 pe r cent in the U.S. 
House, a nd 2 percent in the U.S. Senate . 
Winner's 
vote 
Winner ' s 
party strength 
Winner's 
expenditure 
TABLE 1 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: 1977 KENTUCKY HOUSE RACES 
Challenger-Incumbent Races 
Mean St. dev. * N** 
70 % 24 % 34 
69 13 34 
64 22 34 
Mean 
63 
G6 
68 
Open Seat Races 
St. dev. 
12 
16 
23 
SOURCE(S): Expenditure information compiled from the Kentucky Primary and General 
Election, 1977, Kentucky Registry of Election Finance , Jan. 1978 . 
N 
12 
12 
12 
Election returns compiled from the Official Primary and General Election Returns for !!22, Kentucky Secretary of States Office , Jan . 19 79. 
*Standard deviation. 
**Number of cas~s . 
TABLE 2 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: 1978 U.S. CONGRESSIONAL RACES 
Cha11en~er-Incumbent Races Open Seat Races 
Mean St. dev. N Mean St. dev . 
U. S. House 
Ninner's 
vote 66% 10 % 309 58 07 
Winner's 
party strength 62 13 309 61 19 
Winner's 
expenditure 72 21 309 59 17 
U.S. Senate 
Winner 's 
vote 60 09 21 62 08 
Winner's 
party strength 53 09 21 49 11 
Winner's 
expenditure 67 18 21 63 16 
SOURCE: Election returns and spending data compiled from The Congressional Quarterly , Sept . 29, 1979, pp. 2154-2163 . 
N 
51 
51 
51 
12 
12 
12 
16 
competitiveness, with the mean winner's party strength leos 
than 50 percent in open seat races. 16 
Differences be tween challenger-incumbent and open seat 
races, while not pronounced, are predictable. At eacr 
l e vel, with the exception of the U.S. Senate , the percentage 
of the vote won by ths winning candidate is somewhat less in 
open seat races. The absence of an incumbent is likely to 
result in closer, more compet! tive races. Finally, the win-
ner's party strength advan~age is somewhat less in open seat 
races. 
II. Regression Analysis 
Multiple regression analysis was used with winner ' s 
party strength and winner's expenditures as the independe nt 
variables and winner's vote as the dependent variable . Win-
ner's party strength was entered first in the regression 
equation on the premise that the advantages due to party 
logica lly precede the possibll' .e nefits of campaign spend-
ing . 
Table 3 presents the regression analysis for Kentucky 
ra~~s . The difference in the model's explanatory power in 
challenger-incumbent and open seat races is startling. One 
possible explanation for the mGdel's impotence regarding 
challenger-incumbent races , and strength regarding open seat 
16The decline in the influence of party in Senate 
elections is documented by Warren L. Kostroski in "Party and 
Incumbency in Pos t-war Senate Elections: Trends, Patterns 
and Mode l s,1I American Political Science Review 6 7 (December 
1973) :1213- 34. 
TABLE 3 
MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS: EFFECT OF WINNER'S ~XPENDITURES AND PARTY 
STRENGTH ON IHNNER' S VOTE PERCENTAGE. 1977 KENTUCKY HOUSE RACES 
Winner's 
party strength ( %) 
Winner's 
expenditures ( %) 
Challen2er-Incurnbent Races 
Beta- R 2** Si2· *** 
.09 . 00 NS 
- . 04 . 00 NS 
°Een Seat Races 
N Beta R2 Si2· 
34 .4 5 .42 .05 
34 . 58 .69 .01 
*Beta refers to the change in winner's vote for each unit of change in the 
independent variable . 
**R2 is adjusted for sample size and degrees of freedom. 
***Statistical significance levels of R2 are reported at each step of the model 
cumulatively. NS: not statistically significant . 
N 
12 
12 
18 
races, may l ie with low l eve ls of challenger spending. Ex-
penditures are of little consequence in Kentucky challenger-
incumbent races because challengers have not presented a 
threat to incumbents serious enough to warrant an increased 
r e liance on spending as a campaign tool. Challengers o nly 
spent an average of 34 perc~nt of the total two-party expen-
ditures. While the percentage of total expe nditures by 
losing candidates in open seat race~ is not appreciably 
higher , (37 percent), Kentucky H(.. use incumbents can evi-
dently rely on their ~ncumbency in order to win. As the 
data presented in the next chapter will indicate, challenger 
expenditures have very little effect on the challenger's 
vote percentage in Kentucky legislative races. 
An explanation for the apparent independence of party 
strength and vote percentage in Kentucky challenger-
incumbent races poses a more difficult task. As noted ear -
lier , Kentucky i s less competitive t t ~n many states. The 
predominance of Democrats makes many gene ral e lections a 
mere formality, with the real choice bt::ing made in the Demo-
cratic pr imary. Furthermore , almost all of the districts 
not dominated by the Democratic partl are controlled in an 
equal ly impressive manner by the Republicans. The fact that 
the party strength measure is based on only two election 
years suggests an overlap between party strength and the 
advantage of incumbency. 
Results of the U.S. House analysis, shown in Table 4, 
are comparable with the findings of previous research. 
TABLE 4 
MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS: EFFECT OF WINNER'S EXPENDITURES AND PARTY 
STRENGTH ON I'lINNER' S VOTE PERCENTAGE. 1978 U. S. CONGRESSIONAL RACES 
Cha llenger-Incumbent Race s 0l2en Seat Races 
Beta R2 Si9 · N Beta R2 Si9· 
U.S. House 
Winner's 
party strength ( ~ ) .36 .24 .001 309 .12 .0 4 NS 
Kinner ' s 
expenditure (% ) .4 6 . 43 .001 309 .51 .28 .001 
U.S . Senate 
Winne r's 
party st r ength (%) .36 .18 .05 21 .09 . 00 NS 
Winner ' s 
e x penditure ( %) .34 .25 .05 21 38 .00 NS 
N 
51 
51 
12 
12 
.... 
'" 
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In both the Senate and the House campaign spending is linked 
to e lectoral success. In each chamber the impact of expen-
ditures is of similar magnitude in both open seat and 
challenge r-incumbent races . Howeve r , race s i nvo lving an ':' n-
c umbenl differ fr o m ope n conte sts i n t h e s i gn ifi ca nce o f 
party suppo rt. In both the House and the Senate, party 
accounts for less variance in open seat races than in 
challenger-incumbent contests . FJrthermore , the party 
strength beta weights for challenger-incumbent races may be 
artificially high. In those cases where the winning candi-
date is an incumbent, the party strength measure (based on 
tnree previous election years) will reflect the congress-
men ' s incumbency advantage as well as his party support . 
Indeed, there has been evidence to suggest that incumbency 
17 
has begun to serve as an alternate voting cue to party . 
What is most surprising about these r esults is that in 
each type contest expenditures h~ _ ~ a stronger impact on 
votes in the U.S. House than in t he Se nate. Previous 
research ha s fairly consistent ly found that campaign s pend-
ing .... -'erts more inf lue nce on electoral success in the Senate 
than in the House. IS One interpretation of this finding is 
related to the increasin g vulnera_l"dlity of Senate incwnbents 
as compared with House inc umbents in recent years. 
17Ibid ., p. 1233. 
18See Dawson and Zinser, p. 400: Jacobson, p. 478 . 
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In 1970, 88 percent of Senate incumbents were re-
e lec ted , compared with only 60 percent in 1978. Meanwhile, 
the percentage of House incumbents reelected has remained 
very high, (95 pe rcent in 1 9 70, 93 percent in 1 978) .19 A 
number of ins titutional factors may b e at work here. Six 
year t erms may make ~ t e asie r for senators to drift out of 
touch with the e l ec torate. Indeed , the mobility of the 
e l ectorate often confronts ar incumbent senator with a 
rather l a rge bloc of new ':oters e ach term. But cle arly the 
most critical ~ ac tor accounting for the vulnerability of 
senators is tha t they are much more v i s ib le t h a n the ir CQun-
t e r parts i n the House. House members a re usua lly not s ub-
jected to the degree of s crutiny exper ienced by senators. 
Senators a r e forced to deal with controve rsial issues more 
of t e n t han House members. Their higher profile makes sena-
tors much better t a rgets for voters and inte r e st-groups in 
a time of increasing cynicis~ regarding government in gen-
e r a l. By contrast, a g r e a t d e al of a House member's time 
and effort is devoted to const i Luent service which, if 
~ ffect ive ly handled, may ove rshadow con t rove r s ial aspec t s of 
his pol icy vi e ws and decisio~s.20 
I ronically , th e purpose o f campaign spending is t o 
increase voter awareness, in effect , to realize the high 
profile which seems to be working agains t Senate incumbents. 
19"senators Face Tough Ree l ection Odds,to Congressional 
Quarterly 38 (April 5, 1980): 905- 909. 
20 Ibid . 
This irony may clarify the role of money in congressional 
elections. It seems reasonable to Suggest that rather than 
"buYing" e l ections , Congressmen "buy " Voter aWareness, which 
can work in either a POsiti ve Or a negative way. In the 
case Of incumb en t senators , current POlitical tides make a 
high profile potentiall y detrimental to the ir reel e ction. 
In the House achieving a high lel e l of recognition more 
often r esults in the obVious a dvantages , Without the disad_ 
vantages recently incurred by senators. 
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This inte r pre t ation is not made l ess Convincing by 
the l ow eXPl ana tory Power Of expenditures in Senate open 
sea t r aces . While inCUmbents may have a somewhat h ighe r 
profile than noninc Umbents, almost any sena torial candidate 
will be SUbjected t o more SCrutiny than a House candidate . 
More importantly, most Senate candidates are per sons of con-
Siderable r eputation before they mak the bid for a Senate 
sea t. A look a t the t wentY-fOur senatoria l candidates f Or 
open Seats in 1978 r eveals fo ur ex-re preSen tatives , three 
ex-governors, one eX-basketba l l star, several mill ionaires , 
Elizabett TaYlor's husband, and Alf Landon ' s daughter. 
Senatorial candidates r a r e l y rise from Wh a t one would call Obscurity . 
In summary , it is POSSible that a Certain minimum 
l eve l of expenditure s is necessary befo r e Spending can be 
effec tive in prOdUCing Votes. And Where such level s of 
Spending a r e attained, the increase in a candidate's Vote r 
awareness can either work to his Or her benefit or 
detriment. This suggests that money often operates as a 
necessary but not SUfficient condition for electoral su~­
cess . 
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The next task is to examine challenger-inCumbent races 
more closely. An effort will be made to assess the relative 
importance of challenger and inCumbent spending . Also, the 
degree to which incumbent spending is determined by challen-
ger spending will be investigated. 
CHAPTER III 
SPENDING IN CHALLENGER-INCU~1BENT RACES 
While no single factor can offset all the various 
advantages of incumbency, money would seem to be the most 
critical. Media exposure dire cted towards improving name 
recog nition, professional staff people, campaign literature , 
and a vari~ ty of organizational tasks all require funds. 
Thus, campaign spending is being posited as a major variable 
in e xplaining the outcome of challenger-incumbent legisla-
tive contests. 
I. Methodology: Measurement of the Variables 
The regression equations developed to investigate the 
role of challenger campaign spending employ the following 
variables: 
Challenger's 
~, 
Challenger ' s 
party strength, 
acts as the dependent variable and is 
defined as the challenger's vote divided 
by the total two- party vote . 
an independent variable, is defined as 
the chal : enging party's total vote in 
three previous election years for the 
seat, divided by the tota l two-party 
vote in these three election years. 21 
21AS in Chapter Two, two previous election years are 
used for Kentucky House races. 
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Challenger's 
expenditures , an independent variable, is defined as the 
total of the challenger's primary and gen-
eral electio:"l expenditures, divided by the 
total of the challenger's and the incum-
bent's expenditures in both primary and 
general elections . 
Challenger's 
dollar 
expend~tures, is defined as the challenger ' s total 
expenditur es , both in the primary and the 
general election. 
Incumbent's 
dollar 
expenditures, is defined as the total expe nditures of 
the incwnhent, both in the primary and 
general elections. 
II. Regression Analysis 
A. Challenger Expenditures and 
Electoral Outcomes 
t-tultipl e regression analysis was used with challen-
ger ' s party strength and expend itures as the independent 
variables and the challenger 's vote as the dependent vari-
able . Again , party strength was entered first in the equa -
tion . Table 5 presents the findings for KE 'O' "" ..lcky House and 
u.s. Hous e and Senate races. 
Ne ither party strength o r expe nditures seem to affect 
the electoral per{ormance of challenge rs in Kentucky House 
races. The number of uncontested races included in the 
party strength measure may account for the lack of explana-
tory power the variable affords in Kentucky challenger-
incumbent races. Of sixty-eight races used to construct the 
party strength measure , nineteen were uncontested. This 
TABLE 5 
MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS: EFFECT OF CHALLENGER'S 
EXPENDITURES AND PARTY STRENGTH ON CHALLENGER 'S 
VOTE PERCENTAGE . 1977 KENTUCKY HOUSE AND 
1978 U. S. CONGRESSIONAL RACES 
Be ta R2 Sig. 
Ky. House 
Challenge r I 5 
party st r e ng th ( %) . 10 .00 NS 
Challenge r ' s 
e xpe nditure s ( % ) .02 . 00 NS 
U.S . Hous e 
Challe nger's 
party stre ngth ( % ) .32 . 21 . 001 
Challe nger's 
e xpendi t ure s ( %) . 51 .45 . on' 
U. S. Senate 
Challenger's 
pa rty strength ( %) . 30 . 14 NS 
Ch o llenger's 
expenditures ( %) 
.57 .44 .01 
26 
N 
34 
34 
309 
309 
21 
21 
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flaw may be seriously distorting the measure as an estimate 
of party strength. 
One would expect that campaign spending would be l ess 
important in a smaller more homogeneous area such as Ken-
tucky, a supposition s uggested by very low spending l eve ls 
in the state. In such ar eas , e lectoral success depends 
less on spending than on personal contacts and the candi-
date's reputation within a smal l g roup ~ f po litical acti-
vists . Initial efforts to v e rify tre idea that constituency 
size affects the importc> :.ce of spending have proven unsuC-
cessful. 22 But the fact thaL so little money is sp~nt on 
Kentuck:' House campaigns, even as compared to other s tate 
legislatures,23 suggests that money is of limited importance 
in these races. Whether o r not the effectiveness of cam-
paign spending varies in an y systematic way with the nature 
of the constituency is a topic to be addressed in Chapter 
Four . 
The regression results fo r U.S . tkHl s e and Senate races 
amply demonstrate the impo rtance of campaign spending to a 
challenger's hopes of unseating an incumbent l eg i s lato r. 
Indeed, in S e nate races, focus ing on challenger expenditures 
and e l ectoral succesS has caused a significant rise in the 
explanatory power of campaign spendi ng. A comparison of the 
22 We l ch, p. 352. 
23In 1977 the mean expenditure for Kentucky House 
incumbents was just $3,9 37 , for challengers $2,614. Glantz, 
Abramowitz, and Burkhart report that in California Assembly 
races the mean ;.ncumbe nt expenditure was $68,000, $32,000 
for challengers (p. 1035). 
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regression results in Table 4 and those p resented in Table 5 
indicates a 24 percent rise in the e xplanatory power of cam-
paign spending in Senate elections . This rise suggests what 
Jacobson and others have demonstrated in e arlier research, 
tha t the effect of challenger spending in producing votes is 
h t h 
' th ' h ' d ' 24 mue grea e r t an ~s e case w~ t ~ncumbent expen 1 t ures . 
B. Determinants of Challenger' s Vote 
Percen tage : Cha lle nger Ve rsus 
In c umbent Expenditures 
A regression equation was de ve lope d to t es t the r~ l a -
tive Contr~butions of challenger a nd incumbe nt expenditures 
t o th e challe nge r' s vo te . The equation inc lude s cha llenger 
and incumbe nt expenditures (in dollars ) as independent vari-
ab l es and cha llenger vote perce ntage as the dependent vari -
able. The variables we r e entered in a s t epwise fashion . 
The r esults of t he r egression are presented in 
Table 6 . Although the beta weight fo r challenger expendi-
tuxes is higher than that F,. r incumbent e xpe nditures in 
Kentucky House races, both varia bles r e main extr e me ly low in 
explana t o ry power . However, U.S. Hous e a nd Se nate r esults 
clearly demonstrate the g r eater importan ce of challe nger 
spending . 
As Glantz, Abramow~tz , and Burkhart have noted , the 
reason for the greate r impact of challenger spending on 
elec tion outcomes may be that the campaign is the cha l len-
ger ' s only opportunity to make an impression on the 
24 
See Glantz et al . , p . 1037; Jacobson, p . 470 . 
TABLE 6 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS : EFFECT OF CHALLENGER 'S EXPENDITU.~S 
AND INCUMBENT'S EXPENDITURES ON CHALLENGER'S VOTE 
PERCENTAGE. 1977 KENTUCKY HOUSE AND 1978 U.S. 
CONGRESSIONAL RACES 
~ R2 Sig. N 
K;[ . House 
Challenger's 
expenditures ($) 
.20 
.008 NS 34 
Incumbent's 
expenditures ( $) 
.06 
.00 NS 34 
U.S. House 
Challenger's 
expenditures ( $) 
. 41 
.24 
. 001 309 
Incumbent's 
expenditure s ($ ) 
.14 
. 2 5 
.001 309 
U.S . Senate 
Cha llenger' s 
expenditures ($ ) 
. 50 
. 21 
.05 21 
Incumbent ' s 
expenditures ( $) 
.001 
.00 NS 21 
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electorate. An i ncumb e nt, however, enters the campaign with 
an established r eputation that he can do little to c hange in 
a short campaign. Thuc; , spending is more critical for chal-
l e ngers than fo r i ncumben t s. 25 
To complete the analysis of challenger-incumbe nt 
races, it i s necessar y to explore the determinants of s pend-
ing as well as the consequences o f such spending. 
C. Reactive Spending 
The line of reasoning deve loped by earlier res e archers 
a s ser ts that the key determinant of incumbe nt spending is 
the threat posed by the challenger. 26 Thi s threat, of 
course , is most easi ly approximated b y the degree of c hal-
l e nger spending. 
A simple r egr ess ion equat ion was cons tructed to test 
the reactive spending theory. Challenger expenditures (in 
dollars) was us pd an an independe nt variable designed to 
predict incumbent exper'~ .L t ures (also measured in dollars )_ 
The r esul ts of the regression a r e r eporte d in Table 7 . 
The data does not strongly s upport the contention that chal-
lenger e xpe nditures are the primary ceterminant of incum-
bent expenditures. Only in the U.S. House do cha l lenge r 
expenditures have a s i gnif icant impact on incumbent spend-
ing. In th e Kentucky House , of course , such a finding is 
not s urpris ing based on earlier analysis which failed to 
2 5G1R~tz e t al., p. 1038. 
26 J acobson , p. 472 . 
TABLE 7 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS: EFFECT OF CHALLENG~a ' S 
EXPENDITURES ON INCUMBENT ' S EXPENDITURES. 
1977 KENTUCKY HOUSE AND 19 78 U.S . 
K;r . House 
Challensc:r ' s 
expenditures ($ ) 
u.s. House 
Challenger ' s 
expenditures ($) 
U.S. Se nate 
Challe nger ' s 
expenditures ($) 
CONGRESSIONAL RACES 
Beta R2 Sig. 
-.16 
.00 NS 
.60 . 35 
.001 
, 34 
.07 NS 
31 
N 
34 
309 
21 
confirm spending as a variable critical to e lectoral suc-
cess. 
It is quite likely that incumbents do spend in reac-
tion to the perceived threat of the challenger. But the 
seriousness of this threat may be judged by incumbents on 
the basis of criteria other than the challenger's spending_ 
The degree of "insider!! support may provide the critical 
indication of a challenger's str~ngth, especia lly in state 
l egislat ive r aces . Other cues used to judge a challenger's 
strength will inc~ude his party affiliation, interest group 
endorsements , and perhaps most importantly his standing in 
public opinion polls . Public opinion polls have become an 
ex tremely important political device, especial l y at the 
national level. In reading media accounts of pub l i c policy 
decisions one is more likely to be informed of the deci-
s ion' s effect on the polls than any substantive explanation 
of the decision. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CAMPA IGN SPENDING AND THE NATURE 
OF THE CONSTITUENCY 
Very few studie s have dealt with environmental vari-
abIes in the study of campaign spending . In an effort to 
discover what determines the level of hroadcast expend i-
t ures , a 1970 study found no significant r e lationship 
between ethnicity, turnout, or urban i sm and the broadcast 
d ' f h ' 27 expen ~tures ate w~nner. Some years later, Welch 
found no signif icant relationship between constituency size 
and the effectiveness of campaign spending in congressional 
e lections. 28 The task to be undertaken here , however , poses 
a quite different research question . 
This research will examine severa ', i :)c io-economic 
variables in an attempt to show that the e ffectiveness of 
campaign money varies with the character , not necessarily 
the size , of ~ ~e constituency. Rather than assuming that 
socio-economic variables affect spending leve ls, which in 
turn affect e l ectoral success, this resealch hypothesize s 
that the effectiveness of campaign expenditures varies with 
27 Dawson and Zin s er, p. 401. 
28 Wel"h, p. 34U. 
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the nature of the constituency in a manner unrelated to the 
volume of campaign spending. 
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It is expected that in more heterogeneous constituen-
cies money is a more effective campaign tJol than i n r e la-
tively homogeneous districts or states. In the former type 
constitu~ncY I one expects a large number of political in-
terests and competitors. A multiplicity of issues, many of 
which have no dir ~ct impact on the average voter, confronts 
both candidates and voters . Such an environment seems espec-
i ally vulnerable to mass media appeals and "image" oriented 
carnpai s-ns. 
By contrast, a les s diverse, predominantly rural, con-
stituency constitutes a politica l me lie u in whic~ alterna-
tive issue stands are more clearly identified and more li.kely 
to serve as meaningful voting cues. In addition, organiza-
tional tasks req uire funds. Such funns would take on added 
importance in a he~ erogeneous constituency, where appeals 
must be made to a .... l. de variety of po litical factions. 
I. Methodology 
A. Case Inclusian Cr i teria 
Bot h U.S. House and Senate races are examined in the 
ana l ysis to follow. However, the distinction be twe en 
challenger-incumbent and open seat races will be abandoned 
for the present purpos e . If the nature of the constituency 
does alter the effectiveness of campaign spending, there is 
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nothing to suggest that such an effect is related to the 
presence or absence of an incumbent. 
B. Measurement of the Variables 
The following variab l es, introduced in Chapter Two 
will be adopted for this analysis: winner's vote , winner ' s 
party strength, and winner ' s expenditures. Recall that each 
of these variables are percentage measures. 
The socio- economic variables selected to measure 
he terogeneity are: 
Urbanism, defined as the number of persons living in 
urban areas , divided by the total population 
of the dis trict or state . 
Minorities, defined as the number of persons in minority 
racial groups, divijed by the total popula-
tion of the district or state. 
Ethnicity , defined as the total numbe r of foreign born 
persons or natives of foreign born or mixed 
parentage, divided by the total population of 
the district or state. 
C. Statistical Design 
Two multiple regression equations wc ~e de veloped in 
order to test the hypothesis . The first equation repeats the 
analysis presenteJ in Chapter Two , except that all 1978 u.s. 
congressional elections are used , regardless of the presence 
of an incumbent. The dependent variable is winner's vote. 
The independent variables are winner's party strength and 
winner ' s expenditures. 
The second regression equa tion was developed in two 
steps. First, a regression analysis was pe rformed with 
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winner ' s expenditures as the dependent variable and urbanism, 
minorities and ethnicity as the independent variables. This 
regression produced the r esiduals of winner's expenditures. 
These data are the original spending figures adjusted for the 
impact of the three socia- economic variables. This new 
expenditure varia ble therefore constitutes a measure of can-
didate spending p urg e d of the effect of the se l ected environ-
me ntal variables. 
A comparison of these reqress ion equations will allow 
a direct examination of the influence of the nature of the 
consti tue ncy o n the effe~tive ness of c ampa i gn spending . 
II. Regression Analysis 
Table 8 presents the results of th e original re gres-
sion model. Table 9 reports the results of the regression 
using the residuals of winner's e xpenditures . 
The results of the regression ana l ys is show no 3upport 
for the hypothesis that heterogene :, / is related to the 
effectiveness o f campaign spending . Cl~arly, removal of the 
impact of socio-e~onomic indicators from campaign spending 
has no ~ appreciably changed the mode l' s explanatory power. 
Beta we i ghts fo r each independent variable are almost identi-
cal . 
To conclude, this res earch has fo und that the effec-
tiveness of campaign spending does not vary with urbanization 
or racial and ethnic composition. A conclusion that e nviron-
mental factors have nothing whatever to do with the role of 
TAB!.E 8 
MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS: EFFECT OF WINNER'S 
EXPENDITURES AND WINNER'S PARTY STRENGTH ON 
WINNER'S VOTE PERCEN'fAGE. 1978 1J. S. 
U.S. House 
Winner' s 
party 
s tre ngth ( ~ ) 
Winner's 
e xpenditures 
U.S. Se nate 
Winner's 
party 
strength (%) 
( %) 
winner' s 
expe nditures ( ~) 
CONGRESSIONAL RACES 
Beta R2 Sig . 
. 29 .19 .001 
.51 . 42 . 001 
.21 .09 NS 
. 3 5 . 17 .0 5 
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N 
360 
360 
33 
31 
TABLE 9 
MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS: EFFECT OF RESIDUALS OF 
WINNER ' S EXPENDITURES' AND WINNER'S PARTY STRENGTH 
ON WINNER'S VOTE PERCENTAGE . 1976 U. S. 
CONGRESSIONAL RACES 
Beta R2 Sig. 
U.S. House 
Winner ' s 
par-t:.y 
strength (% ) .32 .19 .001 
Winner's 
expEl' nd i t ures 
(% • residuals ) .48 .40 .001 
U. S . Senate 
Winner is 
party 
strength ( % ) .2 2 . 09 NS 
Winner's 
expenditures 
( % • residuals) .39 . 20 . 05 
N 
360 
360 
33 
33 
SOURCE: Socia-economic variables were calcul ated from 
information in the Congressiona l District Data Book , 93rd 
Congress. U. S . Government Pr ~nt1ng Office , Wash1ngton , 
D.C .• 19 7 3. 
*Residuals were cal c u lated u sing urbanism , minorities, 
and ethnicity. 
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money in congressional elections is not justified, by this or 
any othe r research . To Guggest that money is equally effec-
tive in all political and social environments seems unreason-
able. However, it may be that situational variables which 
affect money' s effectiveness are either impossible to measure 
or are the sources of intervening variables related to cam-
paign spending and electoral success. 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Previous research has examined a number of issues 
related to the role of campaign expenditures in congressional 
e lections . This research has allowed an inves tigation of 
several hypotheses , many of which were fo rmulate d in earlier 
research, with a single data base. 
The findings pursuant to the first objective of the 
research indicate that the expenditure percentage of winning 
candidates in U.S. congressional elections has a significant 
ef fect on his or her vote percentage. The greater impact of 
spending in U.S. House elections represents a departure from 
previous findings which have noted that the success of sena-
torial cand J \,ates depends on expenditures to a greater extent 
than is the caSe for House members. On e interpretation of 
these results is drawn from the increasing vulnerability of 
Senate incumbents. This vulnerability is best explained by 
the higher profile of senators as compared with representa-
tives . It a ~)pea rs that this higher profile, which is--after 
all--the goal of campaign spending, is often working against 
Senate incumbents. Thus, one can infe r that rather than 
"buying" elections , congressmen "buy*' vote r awareness , which 
may be detrimental as well as beneficial to a campaign. In 
40 
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Kentucky House races, the data indicates that while money is 
a significant determiner of electoral success in open seat 
races, its impact is negligible in challenger- incumbent con-
tests. Incumbent Kentucky House memb _rs can evidently rely 
on their incumbency advantage in order to win. Analysis 
undertak e n to accomplish the second objective of the research 
confirmed this conclus ion . 
An exa', ination of the effect of challenger expendi-
tures and ?arty stre ngth o n the challenger's vote percentage 
showed that a challenger's expenditures in 19 77 Kentucky 
Hous e races had no significant effect on his or her vote per-
centage. However, this same ana l ysis , applied to 1978 U.S. 
House and Senate races, confirmed the importance of challen-
ge r spending . Focusing on the impact of chal l enger spending, 
rather than on the expenditures of the winning candidate, 
caused the e xplanatory power of money in Senate elections to 
rise significa "~ly. This rise suggested the greater impor-
tance of chal!Oc l1ger spending as opposed to incumbent spend-
ing. Regr ession dna lys i s using both challenger and inc ..... nbent 
expenditures confirmed the greater importance of the former 
in producing vctes . In addition, the analysis undertaken in 
Chapter Three attempted to confirm the hypothesis that the 
key de terminant of the incumbent ' s expenditur es is the threat 
posed by the challenger. Simple regression analysis showed 
that, except in u.s. House races, challenger expenditures are 
a ~oor predictor of incumbent expenditures . The data sug-
gests that while the t heory of reactive spending may be 
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operable, challenger expenditures are not the sole criterion 
used by incumbents to assess the seriousness of the opposi-
tion ' s challenge. 
In fulfillment of the third objective, the research 
examined the effect of socia-economic variables on the rela -
tionship between campaign apending and electoral success. It 
was hypothesized that in relatively diverse , heterogeneous 
constitue ncies, money is a more ef f e ctive campaign tool than 
in more homogeneous districts OJ.: states. Regression analysis 
using the residuals ~ f the expenditure variable, purged of 
the ef fect of urbanism, minorities , and ethnicity , fail e d to 
con f irm the hypothesis. 
Any politi ca l system which adheres to the form , if not 
the s ubstance , of democratic government must concern itself 
with the process of selecting leadership. Specification of 
the conditions under which money becomes more or less ~ i9-
nificant in determining electoral 0' -' ~ ~omes is an important 
task for American political scientis t s and one that must be 
pursued further. 
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